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Abstract
Current packet filters have a limited support for expressions based on protocol
encapsulation relationships and some constraints are not supported at all, such
as the value of the IP source address in the inner header of an IP-in-IP packet.
This limitation may be critical for a wide range of packet filtering applications,
as the number of possible encapsulations is steadily increasing and network op-
erators cannot define exactly which packets they are interested in. This paper
proposes a new formalism, called eXtended Finite State Automata with Predi-
cates (xpFSA), that provides an efficient implementation of filtering expressions,
supporting both constraints on protocol encapsulations and the composition of
multiple filtering expressions. Furthermore, it defines a novel algorithm that
can be used to automatically detect tunneled packets. Our algorithms are vali-
dated through a large set of tests assessing both the performance of the filtering
generation process and the efficiency of the actual packet filtering code when
dealing with real network packets.
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1. Introduction
While protocol encapsulations were rather simple in the past (e.g., TCP/UDP
in IP in Ethernet), new necessities, arising in particular from network virtualiza-
tion, are rapidly increasing the complexity of the protocol stack. This impacts
on the complexity of packet filters, which represent the basic building blocks5
for many applications such as firewalls and network monitors. In fact, while
on the one hand packet filters should be able to capture all the traffic of in-
terest (e.g., web traffic) independently from the actual encapsulations used at
the lower layers (e.g., plain Ethernet or a tunnel transporting IPv6 traffic over
IPv4 networks), on the other hand they should allow to finely select/filter only10
packets that include specific protocol encapsulations (e.g., PPP in GRE, TCP
in the second IP header instance of the packet).
Traditional packet filters, which are based on the existence of some protocol
and on the value of some protocol fields, do not allow such a precise selection
of traffic according to the encapsulations found in packets. For example, they15
cannot specify the value of the IP source address in the inner header of an
IP-in-IP packet.
The precise filtering of such traffic requires both a packet filtering language
that allows to express conditions on the encapsulation relationships between
protocols, and an efficient implementation of that language in order to cope with20
the speed of current networks. While the Network Packet Filtering Language
(NetPFL) [1] already addresses the first point, its implementation is still partial
and not optimized in case of complex protocol encapsulation rules [2].
Based on the above considerations, this paper brings the following contribu-
tions to packet filtering. First, it proposes the eXtended Finite State Automata25
with Predicates (xpFSA), a new formalism to represent filtering expressions and
that extends the pFSA (Finite State Automata with Predicates) packet filtering
model [3]. Like its ancestor, xpFSA guarantees the optimal number of checks on
packet fields in order to identify their possible match of the filtering expression,
even in case of composition of multiple filters. In addition, it introduces counters30
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and elementary operations that reduce the number of states of the automaton,
which results in a more efficient generation of the executable code implement-
ing the packet filter. Second, the paper defines an algorithm that transforms
filtering expressions (potentially including complex protocol encapsulation con-
straints) into xpFSA, which completely replaces the automaton building process35
defined for pFSA and that cannot be used in case of complex encapsulation pat-
terns. Third, it proposes a novel algorithm that can be used to automatically
assign protocols to network layers, which is exploited to detect tunneled encap-
sulations.
In order to evaluate our algorithms and the filtering code generated from a40
xpFSA, we implemented them into the NetBee library [4]. Notably, our imple-
mentation does not require a priori protocols definition; in fact, it exploits a
protocol database provided at run-time that can be easily extended or modified
in order to recognize any new protocol and/or encapsulation, according to the
properties of the NetPDL language [5]. In other words, our implementation45
can support both current and future protocols and encapsulations seamlessly,
provided that the proper description is included in the protocol database.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the related works,
while Section 3 summarizes the main characteristics of the NetPFL language and
the pFSA packet filtering model. Section 4 presents the xpFSA model, while the50
algorithm to transform a NetPFL filtering expression into a xpFSA is detailed
in Section 5. Section 6 shows the algorithm that automatically associates pro-
tocols to network layers. Section 7 provides an overview of the implementation;
experimental results are then shown in Section 8, while Section 9 concludes the
paper.55
2. Related Work
Despite the high number of publications on packet filters, at the best of our
knowledge none of them proposes a solution able to handle filtering conditions
with protocol encapsulation constraints. For example, neither libpcap [6], repre-
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senting the foundation of many packet filtering tools (e.g., tcpdump, Wireshark),60
nor the Wireshark display filters [7] (which replace the basic filtering capabil-
ities of libpcap when packets have to be shown on screen) support such filter-
ing expressions. Instead, the Network Packet Filtering Language (NetPFL) [1]
supports protocol encapsulation patterns in the language definition, but its im-
plementation is partial and limited to traditional packet filters with simple en-65
capsulation rules [2].
Traditional packet filters, such as the CMU/Standford Packet Filter [8],
the BPF [6] and BPF+ [9], PathFinder [10] and the Dynamic Packet Filter
(DPF) [11], focus more on the filtering architecture (a.k.a., virtual machine),
leaving less attention to the programming abstraction. Moreover, they do not70
support constraints on protocol encapsulation patterns and rely on ad hoc opti-
mizations often inspired by compiler-oriented techniques, which are then applied
to the code to be executed.
To support filtering expressions including protocol encapsulation constraints,
this paper proposes xpFSA, namely an extension of the pFSA packet filtering75
model that enables to reuse optimal composition rules and optimization tech-
niques defined in the automata theory [12]. In fact, the idea of extending an
FSA is not new when looking at the broader field of packet processing; for in-
stance, xpFSA takes some inspiring idea from the following proposals, although
none of them was designed (nor able) to satisfy our objectives, some not being80
able even to filter packets.
The eXtended Finite Automata (XFA) [13] formalism augments traditional
FSA with a finite memory and generic executable code to manipulate this mem-
ory, which is oriented to improve efficiency of signature matching in network
intrusion detection systems. Similar ideas can be found also in the Extended85
Finite State Automata (EFSA) [14], which extends traditional FSA with fi-
nite sets of variables in order to model fast intrusion detection and prevention
systems. However, its design goals are rather different, as EFSA is used to
monitor sequences of system calls, which also requires a completely different
algorithm to build the automaton. Similar considerations hold also for pfsr [15],90
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a predicate-augmented finite state recognizer that aims at simplifying the FSA
used in natural language processing. Ruler [16] is a packet rewriter designed to
anonimize traffic traces, which can also be used for packet filtering. It exploits
a generalization of the FSA model called Tagged DFA [17] and uses variables
to store the current position in the input string. FlowSifter [18] and COPY [19]95
extend context free grammars, regular grammars and automaton with predi-
cates on transitions, variables and actions. Particularly, they define Counting
Regular Grammars (CRG) [18] and Distinguishable Counting Regular Gram-
mars (DCRG) [19] as extensions of regular grammars that use counters; albeit
their theoretical degree of expressiveness is equivalent to our proposal, the im-100
plementation is rather different and targets a diverse use case. In fact, they
aim at efficiently parsing application layer protocols (e.g., Facebook, Youtube)
and extract fields of such protocols, while the goal of our work is to recognize
packets satisfying constraints expressed on protocol encapsulations, with strong
requirements in terms of real-time recomputation of the filtering code.105
The Stateless FSA-based Packet Filter (SPAF) [20] model for packet filter-
ing, which is the predecessor of pFSA and xpFSA, guarantees code optimality
and safety, and it could be used to represent filtering expressions that include
protocol encapsulation constraints. However, it is extremely slow in the au-
tomata generation phase because of the large number of generated states, and110
it is therefore suitable only for applications that can tolerate long filter genera-
tion time.
Finally, an early ancestor of the algorithm described in this paper has been
presented in [2]; however, that algorithm does not support filters including the
header indexing, the tunneling constraint and predicates on protocol fields (de-115
scribed in Section 3.1).
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3. Background
3.1. Network Packet Filtering Language (NetPFL)
The NetPFL [1] is a declarative high-level language aimed at describing the
conditions that a packet must satisfy in order to be accepted. Unlike other lan-120
guages for packet filtering, NetPFL does not define any protocol header and
encapsulation by itself, but it exploits definitions described externally, e.g.,
through the Network Packet Description Language (NetPDL) [5]. Moreover,
NetPFL filtering expressions, or header chains, extend the traditional condi-
tions based on the existence of some protocols and on the value of some pro-125
tocol fields with conditions based on protocol encapsulation patterns, such as a
specific chain of protocol headers.
This is achieved with the in and notin keywords, requiring respectively that,
within a packet, the left-hand protocol is directly encapsulated into the right-
hand one, or that the left-hand protocol is encapsulated in any protocol but130
the right-hand one. For instance, tcp in {ip,ipv6} matches packets having
TCP directly encapsulated in IP or IPv6, while tcp notin ip accepts packets
in which TCP is encapsulated in any protocol but IP. To define an encapsulation
in which any protocol is valid, the literal any can be used; as an example, tcp
in any in ppp is satisfied by packets having the TCP header encapsulated in135
any protocol, in turn encapsulated in PPP. Notably, the sequence of protocols
specified in the filtering expression could start anywhere in the packet, there-
fore it could be preceded and followed by any protocol repeated an unspecified
number of times.
Repetition operators describe conditions in which one or more protocols may140
occur a variable number of consecutive times in a certain position of the packet.
In particular, “+” means one or more occurrences of the given protocol, “∗”
corresponds to zero or more, while “?” means zero or one. For example, the
filter ip in vlan* in ethernet accepts the packets having IP encapsulated in
zero or more consecutive VLAN headers, preceded by an Ethernet header.145
More complex filters based on protocol encapsulations are available as well.
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For instance, tcp.sport==80 in (ip.src!=10.0.0.1)+ in ethernet matches
packets having the TCP protocol encapsulated in a sequence of one or more con-
secutive IP headers, in turn encapsulated in Ethernet; furthermore, the TCP
source port must be equal to 80, while the source address of each IP header150
must be different from 10.0.0.1.
The header indexing construct selects a particular occurrence of a protocol
header within the packet; for instance, tcp in ip%2.src==10.0.0.1 matches
all packets having TCP directly encapsulated in the second IP header of the
packet, whose source address must be 10.0.0.1. The tunneling constraint re-155
quires instead that a particular protocol is encapsulated in a tunnel (e.g., ipv6
tunneled); note that NetPFL does not indicate when a protocol is involved in
a tunnel, which is left to the protocol database language instead.
Finally, multiple conditions on packets can be defined using the Boolean
operators and and or. For instance, the filtering expression (ip.src==1.0.0.1160
tunneled) and (ip.dst==192.168.0.1 tunneled) and tcp.sport==2501 and
tcp.dport==80 identifies a TCP section encapsulated in a tunnel.
3.2. Finite State Automata with Predicates (pFSA)
A pFSA [3] is an augmented FSA in which a transition may depend on
the input symbols and on the value of a Boolean predicate associated with the165
transition itself; therefore it is called transition with predicates or p-transition.
Notably, for each p-transition exiting from a state and firing if a predicate p is
satisfied, there exists another p-transition exiting from the same state and that
is triggered in case such a predicate is not satisfied.
When the pFSA is used to model filtering expressions, each state is associ-170
ated with a network protocol and it is reached when that protocol is encountered
inside the packet under analysis1. Instead, predicates associated with transitions
1Two exceptions hold for this rule: (i) the starting state, which is associated with a
“dummy” protocol (called Startproto in the following) and representing the state of the au-
tomaton before starting the analysis; (ii) the state representing the non-accepting condition,
not associated with any protocol and reached if the processed packet does not satisfy the filter.
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consist of “basic blocks” in the form ‘‘protocol.field operator value’’,
possibly combined together with Boolean operators (e.g., tcp.sport==80 or
tcp.dport==80), which allow the transition to fire if the specified conditions175
are satisfied.
Pairs of p-transitions are modeled with another FSA, which sits on top of
the base automaton and is evaluated when a predicate is encountered during
the execution of the pFSA, in order to determine which of the two transitions
must be triggered.180
Figure 1 shows the pFSA representing the NetPFL filter ip.src==10.0.0.12,
which is matched if at least one of the IP headers of the packet satisfies the con-
dition, leading to the final accepting state (double-circled). When the base
pFSA reaches a pair of p-transitions, the control is transferred to the pFSA
sub-automaton implementing the associated predicate; the resulting value (true185
or false) is then returned to the main automaton in order to fire one and only
one transition (the transition associated with the label p in case the predicate
is satisfied, the one associated with the label !p otherwise).
The traditional algorithms and optimizations available for FSA have been ex-
tended for pFSA. Hence, if the filtering expression joins together multiple condi-190
tions through Boolean operators (e.g., tcp.sport==58018 and tcp.dport==80),
a different pFSA is created for each condition, which are then combined in a
single automaton representing the entire filter with optimality guarantees.
When a pFSA is used for packet filtering, the states of the automaton, its
transitions and its set of input symbols derive from the protocol encapsulation195
rules defined in an external protocol database. Those rules can be represented
with the Protocol Encapsulation Graph (PEG), a directed, potentially cyclic
graph that models the encapsulation relationships among protocols. As shown
in Figure 23, each node of the PEG corresponds to a different protocol, while
2Note that, for the sake of clarity, the final non-accepting state and all the transitions that
lead to it are omitted in Figure 1 and in any other automaton of the paper. Moreover, the
symbol ∗ is used to indicate transitions that fire for every input symbol.
3Unless otherwise specified, the PEG in Figure 2 is referenced in all the examples of the
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Start Eth
{start-eth} {eth-ip}/p
* 
IP
IP
{eth-ip}/!p
{ip-ip}/p
{ip-ip}/!p
src
*
OK
FAIL
*
10.0.0.1
!(10.0.0.1)
src==10.0.0.1
p:  ip.src == 10.0.0.1
predicate true
predicate 
false
Figure 1: pFSA representing the NetPFL filter ip.src==10.0.0.1.
the edge from X to Y means that, within a packet, protocol Y could be directly200
encapsulated into X. Each symbol of the pFSA alphabet represents a different
encapsulation rule and its name comes from the involved protocols: the name
of the originating one first, the target last (e.g., the symbol eth-ip represents
the encapsulation rule among Ethernet and IP).
Note that not all input symbols can be received while the control of the pFSA205
is in a given state. For instance, the symbol eth-ip can be only received when
the pFSA is in the state associated with Ethernet, while the symbol tcp-http
can be received only while the automaton is in the “TCP” state.
4. eXtended FSA with Predicates
An eXtended Finite State Automaton with Predicates (xpFSA)210
is an extension of the pFSA model that: (i) associates input symbols with
operations on counters; (ii) associates p-transitions with predicates that check
paper.
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Start Eth
IP
IPv6 TCP
UDP
VLAN
Figure 2: Example of Protocol Encapsulation Graph (PEG).
the value of such counters. This reduces the number of duplicate states and
hence the cost of composition algorithms, which often depends on the number
of states.215
Formally, an xpFSA is defined with the following seven-tuple:
Axpfsa = (Q,C, Ωc, Σo, δp, q0, F )
where:
Q is a finite set of states;
C is a finite set of counters;
Ωc is a finite set of operations on the counters defined in C;220
Σo is the set of input symbols, each one potentially associated with a set of
operations among those defined in Ωc;
δp is the transition function with predicates (p-transition), where possible
conditions can take into account also the counters defined in C;
q0 is the starting state, among those in Q ;225
F is a set of accepting states, among those in Q.
As in pFSA, each state Q of an xpFSA used for packet filtering is asso-
ciated with one network protocol (with the exceptions already mentioned in
10
{eth-ip}
{ip-ip}/p
{ip-ip}/!p
{ipv6-ip}/!p
Start
{start-eth}
* 
IP
IP
IPv6
{eth-ipv6}
{ip-ipv6}
p:  ip.cntr == 3
{ipv6-ip}/p
Symbol Operation(s)
eth-ip ip.cntr++
ip-ip ip.cntr++
ipv6-ip ip.cntr++
vlan-ip ip.cntr++
Eth
VLAN
{eth-vlan}
{vlan-vlan}
{vlan-ip}
{vlan-ipv6}
Figure 3: xpFSA modeling the NetPFL filter ip%3.
footnote 1); instead, input symbols originate from the encapsulations available
in the PEG and can be potentially associated with a set of operations on coun-230
ters, among those defined in Ωc. When the control of the automaton receives
a symbol, it performs the required operation(s) before triggering the proper
transition(s).
An example of xpFSA using counters is depicted in Figure 3, which models
the NetPFL rule ip%3 and is built referring to the PEG of Figure 2. This235
automaton associates the operation ip.cntr++ with the symbols having IP as
a target protocol (i.e., all the symbols underlined in Figure 3); hence, each
time that one of these symbols is received, the variable ip.cntr is incremented.
Moreover, some p-transitions evaluate the value of this counter to determine
whether the final accepting state can be reached or not. Notably, the same240
xpFSA shown in the picture can be used to evaluate all filters ip%n by simply
changing the value of ip.cntr checked in predicate p.
4.1. Determinism and FSA-related algorithms
Being xpFSA derived from pFSA, most of the definitions and algorithms
presented in [3] are valid here as well. For instance, an xpFSA is deterministic245
if it does not include any  transition (i.e., transitions that do not require any
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input symbol to fire) and, for each input symbol and for all possible values of the
Boolean predicates, there is exactly one enabled outgoing transition, which is
the same definition given in [3]. The same applies with the algorithms for com-
plementation, determinization and minimization; instead, the union algorithm250
requires a new definition as it is influenced by counters introduced in xpFSA.
Particularly, the union algorithm is extended as follows: the set of counters of
the automaton resulting from the union of two xpFSA, is the union of the sets
associated with the two contributing automata. Each of the input symbols of
the resulting automaton is then associated with the union of the sets of oper-255
ations associated with the same symbol in both the original xpFSA. Finally,
the intersection can be implemented through the complementation and union
algorithms according to the first De Morgan’s law, hence it is only indirectly
influenced by extensions defined in xpFSA.
5. Modeling filtering expressions through xpFSA260
The generation of the filtering code implementing a given filtering expression
is a complex process that requires the execution of several steps, which are
summarized in left side of Figure 4. As shown, the filtering expression is first
transformed into an automaton representing the filter itself (e.g., pFSA, xpFSA),
by taking into account all the possible encapsulations that may be found in265
analyzed packets and that are described through a PEG. After creating the
automaton, the corresponding code must be emitted, which implements the
behavior of the automaton itself. Such a code must then be optimized, in order
to finally obtain an efficient packet filter that can be exploited to analyze and
filter packets flowing in a given portion of the network.270
Particularly, this section focuses on the automaton generation step, which
corresponds to the first step in Figure 4, and presents our algorithm that, start-
ing from a protocol database modeled as a PEG and a filtering expressions
potentially including constraints on protocol encapsulations4, creates the corre-
4In fact, our algorithm can create automata modeling both traditional filters expressing
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sponding xpFSA, which is later used to generate the executable code actually275
implementing the packet filter.
filtering expression
(e.g., tcp.dport==80 in ip tunneled)
automaton
generation
packet filter
filtering code 
generation
filtering code 
optimization
xpFSA
ip
ethstart
ipv6
ip
e.g.:
PEG
filtering code implementing
the automaton
accept
reject
incoming packets
NetPFL to xpFSA skeleton
(Section 5.1)
defining input symbols and counters
(Section 5.2)
labeling transitions and managing 
predicates
(Section 5.3)
determinization of the automaton
(Section 5.4)
identification of states representing a 
single protocol
(Section 5.5)
expansion of states and transitions
(Section 5.6)
final xpFSA
(Section 5.7)
combination of multiple filters
(Section 5.8)
xpFSA generation
packet filter
xpFSA
PEGfiltering expression
Figure 4: From the filtering expression to the packet filter: an overall view of the process.
The proposed algorithm deeply differs from the one defined in [3] (Sec-
tion V-E) to build pFSA, which basically obtains the automaton by removing
all the useless edges from the PEG, and potentially enriches transitions with
sub-automata evaluating predicates expressed on protocol fields. As a matter of280
fact, although the pFSA formalism is able per se to model filters with protocol
encapsulation constraints (even if, in some cases, not optimized in the number
of states), the creation algorithm defined in [3] cannot create the automaton
constraints on protocol fields (e.g., tcp, ip.src==10.0.0.1 and ip.dst==10.0.0.2) and filters
that specify protocol encapsulation rules (e.g., tcp.sport==80 in ip, ip%2).
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actually representing such filters. As an example, the filter tcp in ip in ip
requires at least two consecutive instances of IP before TCP, and this cannot285
be modeled by just pruning the undesired edges from the PEG.
As shown in right of Figure 4 and detailed in the remainder of this section,
the new building algorithm is rather complex and has to follow a different ap-
proach to create the xpFSA: it first builds a basic automaton by considering
the filtering constraints, which is then enriched according to the information290
described in the PEG.
5.1. NetPFL to xpFSA skeleton
The goal of this step of the algorithm is to create a first automaton out of the
NetPFL filtering expression and then associate each state with one or more pro-
tocols. This automaton is created starting from the in/notin constructs, while295
the header indexing, the tunneling constraint and the predicates on protocol
fields will be considered later.
To convert the filtering expression into an automaton, the NetPFL statement
is split in a number of tokens, each one defined as:
[in|notin] {proto1,...} [repetitionOp]300
where the elements have the same meaning introduced in Section 3.1.
Each token, starting from the rightmost one, is then converted in a different
block of the automaton through the translation rules depicted in Figure 5, which
come from the automata theory [12]. All the blocks are then connected in order,
and the rightmost state represents the accepting state of the automaton. Since305
the header chain can be matched everywhere into the packet, a further state is
added at the beginning of the automaton5, which includes a self loop firing with
any input symbol; an identical self loop is then added over the accepting state.
The new leftmost state is associated with all the protocols of the PEG, as
each protocol is potentially allowed before those matching the header chain.310
5We can optimize filters having Startproto in the rightmost position: since this protocol
represents the beginning of the packet, this state is omitted.
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ε
ε
proto*proto proto?proto+
Figure 5: Building blocks of the automaton.
Each other state is instead associated with the protocols contained in the token
from which it derives in case of the keyword in, or with all the protocols of
the PEG excluding those listed explicitly in that token in case of the keyword
notin. If the state is reachable also through an  transition, the above protocols
are integrated with those associated with the preceding state. In fact, whenever315
the automaton control is in the origin state of the  transition, it is also in the
target state of such a transition; therefore, its destination state is reached also
when a protocol leading to its source state is encountered within the packet.
Figure 6 depicts the xpFSA skeleton built from the NetPFL filtering expres-
sion tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet and from the PEG shown320
in Figure 2. Moreover, it shows the token from which each building block de-
rives (at the top), and the protocols represented by each state (in the boxes at
the bottom).
5.2. Defining input symbols and counters
Input symbols derive from the protocol encapsulation rules available in the325
PEG. For example, the edge (in the PEG) from IP to IPv6 originates the symbol
ip-ipv6, which will be received by the automaton if the IPv6 header is directly
encapsulated in IP within the analyzed packet. Each input symbol is then
associated with a (potentially empty) set of operations to be executed when
such a symbol is received, before triggering the proper transition(s).330
Particularly, to model filtering expressions it is enough to increment coun-
ters. As described in the following, the rules for defining counters and for asso-
ciating the operation(s) with the proper input symbols depend on whether the
filtering expression has to recognize a specific header instance (defined through
15
Startproto
Ethernet
VLAN
IP
IPv6
TCP
UDP
Ethernet TCP
ethernet {ip,ipv6}+ tcp
IP
IPv6
NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
*
*
NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
token 3 token 2 token 1
Figure 6: Skeleton of the xpFSA.
the header indexing construct) or it has to identify a protocol involved in a335
tunnel (specified through the tunneling constraint).
In fact, for each header indexing that refers to a different protocol, a new
counter is created, whose name is in the form proto.cntr. The increment
of this variable is then associated with those input symbols representing the
identification of an instance of proto inside a packet. Considering the filter340
ip%2, the variable ip.cntr is defined and the operation ip.cntr++ is associated
with input symbols leading to IP, such as eth-ip and ip-ip.
Instead, each tunneling constraint that refers to a protocol of a different
layer originates a counter whose name is in the form Ln.cntr, where n is a
number representing the network layer of the protocol that must be involved in345
the tunnel. The operation Ln.cntr++ is then associated with all symbols leading
to a protocol belonging to a layer greater than, or equal to n6. As an example,
consider the filter ip tunneled; IP belongs to layer 3, then the counter L3.cntr
is defined and the operation L3.cntr++ is associated with symbols leading to
6In fact, a protocol header is encapsulated in a tunnel if the layer of at least one of the
protocol headers preceding it in a packet is greater than, or equal to, the layer of the protocol
that is being considered.
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ε{ip-ip,ipv6-ip}
IP
[IPv6]
IPv6
NetPFL: tcp in ip* in ipv6 in ethernet
{eth-ipv6} {ipv6-tcp,ip-tcp}
ε
Ethernet TCP
*
Startproto
VLAN
IP
IPv6
TCP
UDP
*
{start-eth}
Figure 7: Transitions labeling process.
protocols corresponding, at least, to layer 3 (e.g., eth-ip, ip-ipv6). It is worth350
noting that assigning a layer to each protocol may not be trivial; more details
will be presented in Section 6.
5.3. Labeling transitions and managing predicates
This step associates each non- transition with input symbols (defined ac-
cording to a specific PEG) and, potentially, with predicates.355
A transition is labeled with all the input symbols whose name satisfies the
following constraints: (i) the origin protocol is equal to one of the protocols
associated with the source state of the transition; (ii) the target protocol is
equal to one of the protocols specified by the NetPFL token from which the
destination state comes from. Hence, protocols associated with a state because360
of the  transition cannot be target of the symbols leading to that state, as this
could cause the recognition of wrong packets.
For example, the dark state in Figure 7 is associated with IP and IPv6 but,
since the IPv6 association is due to the  transition, IPv6 cannot be the target
protocol of the symbols on the self loop. This way, this automaton recognizes365
only sequences of protocols matching the filter (e.g., Ethernet - IPv6 - TCP,
Ethernet - IPv6 - IP - TCP, Ethernet - IPv6 - IP - IP - TCP). Instead, if IPv6
were the target of the symbols on the self loop, the automaton would also accept
sequences such as Ethernet - IPv6 - IP - IPv6 - IP - TCP, which does not satisfy
the filter to be modeled.370
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IPv6
{ipv6-ip}/p
IP
NetPFL: tcp in ip%2.src==10.0.0.1 in ipv6
p:  ip.cntr==2 && ip.src==10.0.0.1 
{vlan-ipv6,eth-ipv6,
ip-ipv6} {ip-tcp}
Startproto
Ethernet
VLAN
IP
IPv6
TCP
UDP
TCP
*
{ipv6-ip}/!p
*
IP
Symbol Operation(s)
eth-ip ip.cntr++
vlan-ip ip.cntr++
ip-ip ip.cntr++
ipv6-ip ip.cntr++
Figure 8: Managing predicates.
An exception to these labeling rules is represented by the self loop on the
accepting state, which fires with any input symbol regardless of the protocol
associated with the state itself.
Transitions that remain unlabeled (because no input symbol derived from
the PEG satisfies the above rules) are removed from the automaton, since they375
can never fire.
Constraints on protocol fields, the header indexing construct and the tunnel-
ing constraint originate predicates to be evaluated on transitions. For example,
the predicate p in Figure 8 derives from the requirements on the source IP ad-
dress and on the header indexing expressed on such a protocol. As shown, the380
predicate is assigned to the transition leading to the state associated with the
protocol involved in the predicate itself (IP in the example); moreover, a new
state is created in the automaton, which is associated with the same protocol
but that is reached through a transition firing if the predicate is not satisfied.
Another example is depicted in Figure 9, which shows how the automaton385
representing the filter ip tunneled requires a p-transition towards the right-
most state, which fires only if at least another protocol of layer greater than, or
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{eth-ip,vlan-ip,
ipv6-ip,ip-ip}/p
Startproto
Ethernet
VLAN
IP
IPv6
TCP
UDP
IP
p:  L3.cntr>1
**
Symbol Operation(s)
eth-ip L3.cntr++
eth-ipv6 L3.cntr++
vlan-ip L3.cntr++
vlan-ipv6 L3.cntr++
ip-ip L3.cntr++
ip-ipv6 L3.cntr++
ipv6-ip L3.cntr++
ip-tcp L3.cntr++
ipv6-tcp L3.cntr++
ip-udp L3.cntr++
ipv6-udp L3.cntr++
NetPFL: ip tunneled
{eth-ip,vlan-ip,
ipv6-ip,ip-ip}/!p
IP
Figure 9: Deriving p-transitions form the tunneling constraint.
equal to 3 has already been encountered within the packet. Again, a new state
associated with IP is added to the automaton and reached in case the predicate
is not satisfied.390
As described in [3], each predicate is actually modeled with a sub-automaton
built on top of the xpFSA/pFSA; then, all the sub-automata associated with
the same p-transition are combined using the traditional composition algorithms
defined in the automata theory, which enable to obtain optimized xpFSA even
in case of multiple filtering conditions expressed on the same protocol.395
The process described above labels the transitions of the automaton of Fig-
ure 6 as depicted in Figure 10; as shown, a predicate is associated with tran-
sitions originating in the third state, because of the requirement on the source
port of the TCP header.
5.4. Determinization of the automaton400
The automaton created so far is now determinized according to the rules
defined in [3]. As an example, the determinization process transforms the au-
tomaton of Figure 10 into the one depicted in Figure 11.
Unfortunately, not only states may be associated with multiple protocols, but
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Startproto
Ethernet
VLAN
IP
IPv6
TCP
UDP
Ethernet TCP
{start-eth}
IP
IPv6
{eth-ip,eth-ipv6} {ip-tcp, ipv6-tcp}/p
* *
p:  tcp.sport==80
NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in
{ip,ipv6} + in ethernet
{ip-tcp, ipv6-tcp}/!p
{ip-ip,ip-ipv6,ipv6-ip}
TCP
Figure 10: Automaton with labeled transitions.
1 32
{start-eth}
{eth-ip,eth-ipv6}
4
*-{start-eth} {start-eth}
*-{start-eth,eth-ip,eth-ipv6}
{ip-ip,ip-ipv6,ipv6-ip}
{ip-tcp,ipv6-tcp}/p
*
{ip-tcp,ipv6-tcp}/!p
p:  tcp.sport==80NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
5{start-eth}
*-{start-eth}
{start-eth}
Figure 11: Deterministic automaton representing the filtering expression.
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the state-protocol association might have been lost during the determinization405
process, as evident from Figure 11, which does not show any correspondence
between protocols and states. Then, the next steps of the algorithm manipulate
the automaton until each state is associated with one and only one protocol, so
that reaching a certain state corresponds to reaching a specific protocol within
a packet. This is needed to translate the xpFSA into actual executable code410
that can analyze and filter network traffic.
5.5. Identifying states representing a single protocol
A state corresponds to a specific protocol if all the symbols on its incoming
transitions share the second part of their name, i.e. the target protocol of the
encapsulation rules they represent is the same. Two exceptions are: (i) the415
initial state, which can be associated with startproto only if it does not have
any incoming transition; (ii) the accepting state, whose self loop is (again) not
considered. Each state that can be unequivocally associated with one and only
one protocol is then labeled with the protocol it represents.
After that a state has been labeled, the symbols on its outgoing transitions420
are removed if their originating protocol differs from the one associated with the
state itself. This is possible because symbols represent protocol encapsulation
rules; hence, if the current state is associated with IP, only the symbols leading
to a protocol encapsulated into IP can be received while the xpFSA is in that
state. Obviously, transitions remaining without symbols, and states that cannot425
be reached from the starting state of the automaton or that do not lead to any
accepting state, are removed.
This step transforms the automaton of Figure 11 into that shown in Fig-
ure 12, where states 2, 4 and 5 are associated with a specific protocol.
5.6. Expanding states and transitions430
Each unlabeled state U is now expanded in multiple states, each one asso-
ciated with a different protocol among those that are the target of the symbols
on the transitions leading to U . To model the situation in which the analysis
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1 32-Eth
{start-eth}
{eth-ip,eth-ipv6}
4-TCP
*-{start-eth}
{eth-vlan}
{ip-ip,ip-ipv6,ipv6-ip}
{ip-tcp,ipv6-tcp}/p
*
{ip-tcp,ipv6-tcp}/!p
p:  tcp.sport==80NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
5-TCP
{start-eth}
Figure 12: Automaton after the association of some states with a specific protocol.
of the packet has not started yet, the initial state also originates a new state
associated with startproto and representing the new initial state of the au-435
tomaton, although no input symbol actually leads to such a protocol. As an
example, the dark state in the left of Figure 13 originates two new states in the
right, respectively representing the protocols IP and IPv6.
Each transition exiting from an expanded state is replaced with a new tran-
sition for each one of its symbols. In particular, each new transition starts in440
the new state representing the origin protocol of its symbol, and terminates in
the same state of the original transition. For example, the transition exiting
from the dark state in the left of Figure 13 originates two new transitions: one
labeled with ip-ipv6 coming from the new state associated with IP, the other
firing with ipv6-tcp and originating in the new state representing IPv6.445
Similarly, the transitions entering into an expanded state are replaced based
on the target protocol of their symbols. This way, the transition labeled with
{eth-ip,eth-ipv6,vlan-ip,vlan-ipv6} originates two transitions: one firing
with eth-ip and vlan-ip and leading to the new state representing IP, the
other labeled with eth-ipv6 and vlan-ipv6 and entering into the new state450
associated with IPv6. Figure 13 also shows that the self loop on an expanded
state originates new transitions that start and terminate on the proper new
states, according to the origin and the target protocol of their symbols.
Figure 14 depicts the automaton of Figure 12 after this step of the algorithm,
where states 1 and 3 have been expanded into multiple states. The symbols on455
the new transitions are not specified for the sake of brevity, and they can be
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{eth-ip,eth-ipv6,
vlan-ip, 
vlan-ipv6}
{ip-ipv6, ipv6-tcp}
{eth-ip,
vlan-ip}
{eth-ipv6
vlan-ipv6}
IP
IPv6
{ip-ipv6}
{ipv6-ip,ip-ip}
{ipv6-ip}
{ip-ip}
{ipv6-tcp}
Figure 13: Expansion of a state and the related transitions.
p:  tcp.sport==80NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
Start
UDPIP
IPv6
TCP
vlan
2-Eth
{start-eth} {eth-ip}
{eth-ipv6}
IP
IPv6
{ipv6-ip}
{ip-ip}
{ip-ipv6}
4-TCP
{ipv6-tcp}/p
5-TCP
{ip-tcp}/p
*
{ipv6-tcp}/!p
{ip-tcp}/!p
1 3
Figure 14: Automaton after the expansion of unlabeled states.
easily derived from the protocols labeling the states.
5.7. The final xpFSA representing the filtering expression
The xpFSA created so far may include some states that do not have a path
to any accepting state: consequently, they can be removed without any loss in460
the semantic of the automaton. In some cases, the result of predicates operating
on protocol counters may already be known a priory, i.e., before the generation
of the filtering code. Then, transitions associated with predicates that are never
verified are removed from the automaton, while predicates that are always ver-
ified are removed from the corresponding transitions in order to avoid useless465
checks.
After the pruning of the useless (dark) states and transitions, the automa-
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p:  tcp.sport==80NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
Start Eth
{start-eth} {eth-ip}
{eth-ipv6}
IP
IPv6
{ipv6-ip}
{ip-ip}
{ip-ipv6}
TCP
{ipv6-tcp}/p
{ip-tcp}/p
*
Figure 15: Final xpFSA representing the NetPFL filtering expression.
ton of Figure 14 becomes as shown in Figure 15, which is the final xpFSA
representing the NetPFL filter tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet.
5.8. Combining multiple filters470
In case the NetPFL filter is composed of multiple conditions combined
through Boolean operators, the algorithm presented so far is executed for each of
them and the resulting automata are joined using the composition algorithm(s)
discussed in Section 4.1.
An example is shown in Figure 16, which depicts the xpFSA modeling the fil-475
tering expression (tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet) or ip%27.
Particularly, the automata representing the two parts of the filter are shown
in Figure 16(a) and Figure 16(b), while Figure 16(c) shows the xpFSA model-
ing the entire expression. The set of counters in the final xpFSA is given by
the union of the set of counters associated with the two contributing automata;480
then, it is associated only with ip.cntr, needed to count the number of IP
header instances found in the packet. Moreover, each input symbol is associ-
ated with the union of the sets of operations associated with the same symbol in
the original xpFSA; in fact, all the symbols with IP as a target protocol execute
7In order to get a more readable xpFSA, this automaton has been build referring to a PEG
similar to that of Figure 2, but without VLAN.
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{start-eth}
{eth-ipv6}
{ip-tcp}/p
Eth
TCP
Start
IPv6
IP
{eth-ip}
{ip-ipv6}
{ipv6-ip}
{ipv6-tcp}/pp:  tcp.sport==80
*
{ip-ip}
NetPFL:  tcp.sport==80 in 
{ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet
p:  ip.cntr==2
NetPFL:  ip%2
{start-eth}
{eth-ipv6}
{ip-ip}/p
Eth
IP
Start
IPv6
IP{eth-ip}
{ip-ipv6}
{ipv6-ip}/!p
{ipv6-ip}/p
*
{ip-ip}/!p
a)
b)
Symbol Operation(s)
eth-ip ip.cntr++
ip-ip ip.cntr++
ipv6-ip ip.cntr++
{start-eth}
EthStart
IPv6
{eth-ipv6}
IP
{ip-ipv6} {ipv6-ip}/!p2
IP
*
{ipv6-ip}/p2
{eth-ip}
{ip-ip}
p1:  tcp.sport==80
p2:  ip.cntr==2
TCP
*{ip-tcp}/p1
{ipv6-tcp}/p1
NetPFL:  (tcp.sport==80 in {ip,ipv6}+ in ethernet)                      
OR ip%2
c)
Symbol Operation(s)
eth-ip ip.cntr++
ip-ip ip.cntr++
ipv6-ip ip.cntr++
Figure 16: Composition of xpFSA with protocol encapsulation constraints through the
Boolean or operation.
the operation ip.cntr++ in the automaton of Figure 16(c).485
6. Automatic detection of tunneled protocols
In case the filtering expression to be modeled with xpFSA includes tunneling
constraints (e.g., tcp in ip tunneled, matching packets with the TCP header
encapsulated in an IP header instance involved in a tunnel), the algorithm
presented in Section 5 requires that each protocol in the PEG is associated with490
a layer. In fact, a protocol header is encapsulated in a tunnel if the layer of
at least one of the protocol headers preceding it in a packet is greater than, or
equal to, the layer of the protocol that is being considered.
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At the first sight, the layer can be inferred from the traditional ISO/OSI
protocol stack. For example, Ethernet belongs to layer 2, IP and IPv6 to layer 3,495
while TCP and UDP belong to layer 4. However, there are protocols for which
it might be difficult to choose the “right” layer. A good example is MPLS,
which may be present between Ethernet and IP; hence, it can be considered as
belonging to layer 2, to layer 3, or to an intermediate layer. Therefore, labeling
each protocol with a number indicating its “natural” layer can be a complex500
operation. Furthermore, a previous labeling might not be valid anymore if a new
protocol is added to the database (e.g., VLAN, which may lead to the MPLS
in VLAN encapsulation), as this operation may require an update of the values
assigned to protocols already in the database.
Starting from the observation that, to recognize tunnels, the exact layer505
associated with each protocol is not important per se but only when compared
to layers of other protocols, we propose an algorithm based on the PEG that
provides a strict ordering based on network protocols. For example, to identify
a tunneled IP, it is necessary that both IP and IPv6 are associated with the
same layer, but it is not important the actual value of such a layer.510
The algorithm acts as follows: (i) the layer value for all nodes in the graph is
set to INF (infinite), except for Startproto, which gets the value 1; (ii) the recur-
sive procedure defined in Algorithm 1 is called on the graph, starting from the
node representing Startproto. Particularly, method GetMinSuccessor returns
the smallest layer among those of a protocol successors, while GetMaxPredecessor515
returns the greatest layer among those of a protocol predecessors. In both cases,
self loops are not considered. More in detail, according to lines 20-24 of Algo-
rithm 1, each successor of the considered node is associated with a layer that
is equal to the current layer plus one, in case this new value is lower than the
layer already associated with that node. Then, if a node gets a layer that is520
equal to, or greater than the smallest layer among those of its successors, the
layer value for the node is potentially updated according to lines 11-17. The
algorithm terminates when all the nodes of the PEG are associated with a layer,
and the outcome does not depend on the order in which the nodes of the PEG
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Figure 17: Layer assignment example.
have been visited.525
The example in Figure 17(a) depicts a PEG where all protocols (except Start-
proto) are not associated with any layer. First, the procedure assigns to the suc-
cessors of Startproto, in this case Ethernet, the value ceil(layer(startproto)+1),
i.e. 2. The procedure is then repeated for Ethernet: all its successors (MPLS,
IP, IPv6) get the value 3, as shown in Figure 17(b). When the procedure visits530
the node related to MPLS, it notices that the node’s layer, which is 3, is equal
to the lower layer among those of its successors. Therefore, the layer value
for MPLS is updated to prevlevel+((nextlevel-prevlevel)/2), i.e. 2.5 as
shown in Figure 17(c). Because of the check in line 21 of Algorithm 1, the
successors of MPLS are not updated. Finally, IP and IPv6 are considered but,535
since prevlevel = nextlevel = 3 for both of them, line 15 of the algorithm
is not executed and their layers remain unchanged (Figure 17(d)).
7. Implementation
The proposed algorithm that transforms filtering expressions with proto-
col encapsulation constraints into xpFSA has been integrated in the NetBee540
library [4], whose overall architecture is shown in Figure 18. User-level tools
(e.g., nbeedump) receive as input the NetPFL rule to be executed and the Net-
PDL [5] protocol database. This information is then processed by an high-level
compiler [21] that, after several optimizations, emits the final filtering code un-
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Algorithm 1 Classifying each protocol of the PEG.
1: Procedure AssignProtoLevels (node n)
2:
3: if n.Visited then
4: return
5: end if
6:
7: node.Visited = true
8: minSuccessor = GetMinSuccessor(n);
9: nextLevel = (minSuccessor ? minSuccessor.Level : INF)
10:
11: if nextLevel ≤ n.Level then
12: maxPredecessor = GetMaxPredecessor(n)
13: prevLevel = maxPredecessor.Level
14: if prevLevel < nextLevel then
15: n.Level = prevLevel + ((nextLevel-prevLevel)/2)
16: end if
17: end if
18:
19: level = ceil(n.Level+1)
20: for all s ∈ n.successors do
21: if level < s.Level then
22: s.Level = level
23: end if
24: end for
25:
26: for all s ∈ n.successors do
27: AssignProtoLevels(s)
28: end for
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Figure 18: Overview of the building blocks to generate filtering code.
der the form of NetIL instructions, i.e., the assembly for the NetVM [22] virtual545
machine. NetIL can be either interpreted by the NetVM or translated in na-
tive code for different architectures (e.g., x86, x64, Cavium Octeon) thanks to
a multi-target compiler [23].
The algorithm presented in Section 5 is implemented in the xpFSA builder
module, which takes both the PEG (dynamically extracted from the NetPDL550
database by the PEG builder module, which also associates each protocol with
a layer using the algorithm described in Section 6) and the NetPFL rule and
builds the corresponding xpFSA. Then, the xpFSA lowering module generates
the corresponding NetIL code by translating each state of the automaton ac-
cording to the NetPDL description of the protocol associated with the state555
itself. Although the input symbols for the automaton are generated by a logical
separated module (i.e., the protocol scanner), its operations are implemented
by the same assembly program implementing the xpFSA, hence the NetIL code
corresponding to an xpFSA state contains both the code that implements the
automaton and the one that handles the encapsulations. Finally, the NetIL560
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optimizer executes a set of data and control flow optimizations on such a rep-
resentation; the resulting code is given as an input to the NetVM and, possibly,
further translated into native code (e.g., x64).
8. Validation
The work of this paper has been evaluated through a number of tests, de-565
scribed in the remainder of this section.
8.1. The influence of the protocol database
Before going into detail of our evaluation, it is worth to point out that the
time needed to create the automaton, and the total time required to generate
efficient filtering code out of xpFSA depend on the complexity of the protocol570
database, and hence on the PEG of reference. In fact, the former time increases
with the size of the PEG, which influences both the number of states and the
number of transitions exiting from each state. In turn, more states cause the
generation of more executable code while, at runtime, the number of outgoing
transitions may influence the time needed to determine which is the next pro-575
tocol of the packet. The code generation time also depends on the format of
each protocol, as it grows with the number and the complexity of protocol fields
(e.g., variable length fields require the generation of more instructions than fixed
length fields).
In our evaluation campaign we use several PEGs, which will be detailed580
in each specific test. However, in all the cases we use the official protocols
description provided with the NetBee library [4].
8.2. xpFSA creation, filtering code generation and filtering throughput
This section evaluates the performance of our algorithm to generate the
xpFSA that model filtering expressions with constraints on protocol encapsula-585
tions (Section 5), and the total time required by the NetBee library to generate
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efficient filtering code from xpFSA. Moreover, since our final goal is the pre-
cise filtering of packets, we also report the runtime performance of such packet
filtering code.
Notably, at the best of our knowledge no packet filter supports filtering590
expressions with constraints on protocol encapsulations, then we do not compare
the results of this section with those obtained through other approaches.
The sample filters are shown in Table 1, while Figure 19 reports the PEG of
reference and shows the network layer associated with each protocol, calculated
through the algorithm presented in Section 6. This PEG is quite realistic, since595
it includes several encapsulations and protocols commonly encountered nowa-
days on the Internet. Finally, tests are executed on a workstation equipped
with 16 GB RAM, 1TB hard disk @ 7200 rpm, Intel i7-3770 @ 3.40 GHz CPU
and Ubuntu 14.04 OS, kernel 3.13.0-49-generic, 64 bits. All test processes were
bound to a single processor, with hot disk and processor caches, and the ma-600
chine was otherwise unloaded. Time measurements were performed using the
gettimeofday UNIX function.
8.2.1. Filtering code generation time
According to Figure 20, the time required by our algorithm to create the
xpFSA is at least one order of magnitude lower than the time needed (by the605
NetBee library) to generate the optimized NetIL code implementing the specific
NetPFL rule, for almost all the considered filters.
Moreover, the picture highlights how the code generation time decreases by
increasing the selectivity of the filter, while the time needed to create the xpFSA
follows the opposite trend. For instance, this can be observed by comparing the610
sequence of filters #1, #2 and #3, or the sequence #1, #5 and #6, which both
define filters with an increasing degree of selectivity for matching TCP packets.
Notably, the generation of the automaton is slower if there are less protocols that
could match the initial state in the xpFSA skeleton (Section 5.1). In fact, our
algorithm first expands this initial state in most of the protocols defined in the615
PEG, then it prunes those states that are not necessary. Hence, less protocols
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Figure 19: Protocol Encapsulation Graph.
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Figure 20: Performance of the code generator.
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Table 1: Sample NetPFL filtering expressions with protocol encapsulation constraints, and
percentage of packets matched in the traffic trace used in the evaluation.
# Filtering expression
% of
acceptance
#accepted
packets
#expected
packets
1 tcp 100 14045400 14045400
2 tcp in ip 66 9363600 9363600
3 tcp in ip in ethernet 33 4681800 4681800
4 tcp in ip in ethernet in startproto 33 4681800 4681800
5 tcp in ip in ppp in gre in ip 33 4681800 4681800
6 tcp in ip in ppp in gre in ip in ethernet 33 4681800 4681800
7 tcp in ip in ppp in gre in ip in ethernet in startproto 33 4681800 4681800
8 tcp in ip notin ethernet 33 4681800 4681800
9 tcp in ip tunneled 33 4681800 4681800
10 tcp in ip%2 33 4681800 4681800
11 tcp in ipv6 33 4681800 4681800
12 tcp in ipv6 in ip 33 4681800 4681800
matching this state mean more cuts in the automaton, which results in more
time to create the xpFSA. Instead, filters that explicitly mention startproto
(#4 and #7) immediately generate very compact automata (they do not have
the initial state to be expanded, since it is only associated with Startproto), and620
represent the fastest case for our algorithm that builds the xpFSA representing
a filtering expression.
Scalability - Counters reduce the number of states of the xpFSA, hence
the time required to generate the final code implementing the NetPFL filter.
Figure 21 shows this reduction through filters that require an increasing number625
of IP headers within valid packets, by reporting the number of states and the
filtering code generation time both in case the associated automata use coun-
ters and in case counters are not used. To this purpose, we modified our xpFSA
builder module so that it can also implement the NetPFL header indexing con-
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Figure 21: Advantage of using counters in xpFSA.
struct without using counters. The automata have been built using a PEG that630
includes only the dark states shown Figure 19.
Without counters, the number of states grows steadily with the number
of required IP headers, since the automaton representing ip%n consists in the
automaton associated with ip%(n-1), enriched with all paths leading from IP to
IP. Instead, with counters, we can observe an increase in the number of states635
only between filters ip and ip%2, while, from ip%2 onwards, the state count
remains constant. Then, in terms of complexity of the automaton, counters
bring advantages for filters requiring that a specific protocol header appears at
least twice in the packet.
Regarding the total compilation time, counters are beneficial from filter ip%4640
forward, and such an advantage increases with the number of required IP head-
ers. Instead, in case of ip%2, the cost of managing counters exceeds that required
to compile a further state in the automaton. With filter ip%3, the cost of coun-
ters is equivalent to that of managing three additional states, resulting in the
same compilation time regardless of the fact that counters are used or not.645
As a final remark, even if the reduction in the number of states, and hence of
the compilation time, is minimal in our example, it could be substantial both in
case of more complex filters, and in other fields different from packet filtering.
In [13], the advantage of the reduction of the number of states through the
assignation of instructions to the automaton has been demonstrated using the650
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XFA model in the field of string matching.
8.2.2. Filtering throughput
In order to evaluate the quality of the filtering code generated by xpFSA,
namely the x64 assembly program that actually analyzes and filters packets,
we executed the filters of Table 1 on a synthetic traffic trace composed of655
three packets of 700B8 repeated as many times as needed to obtain about
9.15 GB of traffic. Those packets aim at reproducing some common encap-
sulations, namely ethernet-ip-tcp, ethernet-pppoe-ppp-ip-ipv6-tcp and
ethernet-ip-gre-ppp-ip-tcp. Particularly, the second packet can be observed
in an IPv4-only xDSL-based access network connecting to the Internet a client660
using IPv6 as a network protocol, while the last packet is used in a PPTP-based
VPN.
The percentage of packets accepted by each filter is reported in the third
column of Table 1, while the last two columns respectively show the number
of packets accepted by the filter and the number of packets expected to be665
accepted. Since these two numbers always coincide, the filtering code generated
from xpFSA is correct for each of the considered filters, and actually implements
the constraints expressed in the filtering expression. Consequently, being the
filtering code generated from xpFSA correct, it is also correct our algorithm
presented in Section 5, which transforms the filtering expression into an xpFSA.670
Figure 22 shows the number of packets per second analyzed by the sam-
ple NetPFL filters. Note that one-time computations (e.g., filter compilation)
do not affect the result of this test, while runtime overheads (e.g., per-packet
libpcap library call) are included in the results. As shown, performance in-
crease when the filter is more specific, i.e., when it leaves less freedom to the675
protocols that may appear in a given position of the packet. Notably, according
to the graph, encapsulation-aware filtering code can be applied on a 10 Gbps
link without any packet loss, if considering an average packet size of 700 bytes.
8This value roughly represents the average packet size on the Internet.
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Figure 22: Performance of the filtering code generated by xpFSA.
Table 2: Filtering throughput with respect to TCP session filters.
# TCP sessions Throughput (Mpps)
1 4.3
2 4.2
3 4.2
Scalability - In order to provide an insight of the scalability of the filtering
code generated out xpFSA, we also executed a number of filters that select an680
increasing number of TCP sessions encapsulated in a tunnel. A single TCP
session is represented by a filtering expression in the form ((ip.src==x.x.x.x
tunneled) and (ip.dst==y.y.y.y tunneled) and tcp.sport==X and tcp.dport==Y),
while the Boolean or operator is used to combine together filters matching dif-
ferent sessions.685
Filtering code have been executed on the synthetic traffic trace mentioned
before (each filter matched one third of packets), and results are reported in
Table 2. As shown, filtering code generated by xpFSA does not suffer any sig-
nificant runtime performance degradation when the number of filtered sessions
increases. This is due to the fact that the generated automaton grows wider,690
but not deeper; as the number of sessions increases, more and more states are
added in parallel to the old ones, but the average distance from the starting
state to the accepting states does not change.
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8.3. Support for traditional filters
The algorithm presented in Section 5 also creates xpFSA representing tradi-695
tional filters based on the existence of some protocols and on the value of some
protocol fields. Then, this section evaluates our algorithm when applied to
those filters, and compares it with the algorithm proposed in [3] (Section V-E),
which models (only) traditional filters with pFSA. It is worth mentioning that
we compare our proposal with [3] because both of them: (i) represent filtering700
expressions through augmented FSA; (ii) exploit an external protocol database
represented as a PEG. The comparison with other solutions for packet filtering
(e.g., SPAF, BPF) is not repeated in this paper, as [3] already compares them
with the algorithm defined for pFSA.
We repeated the same tests reported in [3] with the new algorithm; the sam-705
ple filters are shown in Table 3, using two different PEGs. The simple PEG
includes only the definitions for Ethernet, IPv4, TCP and UDP, without recur-
sive encapsulations. The complex PEG includes also the definitions for VLAN,
ARP, PPPoE and IPv6, together with the following tunnels: IPv4-in-IPv4,
IPv6-in-IPv4, IPv6-in-IPv4. Finally, as in [3] tests have been executed on a710
workstation equipped with an Intel E8400 Core 2 Duo dual-core processor with
4 GB of RAM, running a 64-bit version of Ubuntu 10.04.
Table 3: Sample traditional NetPFL filters.
# Filtering expression
1 ip
2 ip.src == 10.1.1.1
3 tcp
4 ip.src == 10.1.1.1 and ip.dst == 10.2.2.2 and tcp.sport == 20 and tcp.dport == 30
5 ip.src == 10.1.1.1 or ip.dst == 10.2.2.2 or tcp.sport == 20 or tcp.dport == 30
Figure 23 depicts, in logarithmic scale, the time needed by the algorithm
proposed in [3] to create the pFSA, and by the new algorithm to create the
xpFSA representing the filters of Table 3, both with simple and the complex715
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Figure 23: Comparison of the time needed by our algorithm and by that proposed in [3] to
create the automaton out of a filtering expression.
databases. According to the picture, although the new algorithm is considerably
more complex then its ancestor, it does not introduce considerable overhead
when used to model traditional filtering expressions, and it even performs better
in some cases.
Notably, since the filters in Table 3 do not include constraints on protocol720
encapsulations, the pFSA/xpFSA generated by the compared algorithm are
identical. Consequently, they originate the same filtering code, which obviously
provides the same performance (in terms of packets per second) when used to
analyze network traffic.
9. Conclusion725
Currently, no existing packet filter enables the precise filtering of network
packets based on constraints on protocol encapsulation relationships; this pre-
vents applications to finely select traffic they are interested in, e.g., in case of
complex protocol encapsulations and/or tunnels. To address this limitation,
this paper presents an algorithm that efficiently implements packets filters that730
include protocol encapsulation constraints.
The proposed algorithm supports filtering expressions that filter packets that
may include: (i) specific header sequences (e.g., tcp.sport==80 in ipv6, ipv6
notin vlan); (ii) a specific value for a field in a given header instance (e.g.,
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ip%2.src==10.0.0.1); (iii) a given protocol encapsulated in a tunnel (e.g.,735
ip.src==10.0.0.1 tunneled, ip tunneled).
Particularly, such an algorithm, starting from a filtering expression written
according to the Network Packet Filtering Language (NetPFL), and from a
protocol database modeled as a Protocol Encapsulation Graph, models the filter
by means of xpFSA, a novel formalism that extends the Finite State Automata740
with predicates (pFSA). xpFSA guarantees optimal composition of multiple
filtering expressions and efficient packet filtering code. Moreover, it defines
operations (i.e., the increment of counters) to be executed when specific input
symbols are received; this causes a reduction of the number of states of the
automaton and then a reduction of its complexity.745
Finally, the paper proposes an algorithm that can be used to automatically
recognize packets that include tunneled protocols, which is based on the dynamic
association of each protocol to its supposed network layer.
Evaluation shows the efficiency of the algorithm that transforms filtering
expressions into automata, the time required to generate filtering code out of750
xpFSA, and the runtime performance of the generated packet filtering code. We
also show how our algorithm does not penalize traditional filters only based on
constraints on protocol fields, as well as we evaluated scalability of the automa-
ton and of the generated packet filtering code.
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